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Briefing Cases 
University of Baltimore School of Law 
March 27, 2010 
Session on Copyright Law 
Prof. Lynn McLain 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Ninth Circuit. 
WALT DISNEY PRODUCTIONS v. AIR PIRATES, 
581 F.2d 751 (1978). 
Appeal from the Northern District of California. 
Before CHAMBERS, CUMMINGS, and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges. 
CUMMINGS, Circuit Judge. 
This case involves the admitted copying of plaintiff Walt Disney Productions' ("Disney") 
cartoon characters in defendants' adult "counter-culture" comic books. The present defendants 
are three individuals and two business entities operated by them. The complaint alleges that they 
infringed Disney copyrights, a Disney trademark and engaged in unfair competition, trade 
disparagement and interference with Disney's business. Disney sought injunctive relief, 
destruction of infringing materials, damages, costs and attorney's fees. The district court 
awarded Disney a temporary restraining order and subsequently granted its motion for a 
preliminary injunction, simultaneously issuing an opinion reported in 345 F.Supp. 108 
(N.D.CaI.l972). As Judge Wollenberg noted in his opinion, the basic facts are undisputed. He 
found as follows (at 109-110): 
Plaintiff holds valid copyrights on the various works noted in the first seven causes of 
action. The works protected by the copyrights comprise a series of cartoon drawings ranging 
from a single page to "book length." The cartoons depict the antics of characters created by 
plaintiff, with "balloons" over each of the characters' heads containing dialog. Cartoons are 
drawn to form a narrative. 
According to plaintiff, defendants infringed Disney copyrights by copying the graphic 
depiction of over 17 characters.[FN5] Two of the characters are represented as insects, and the 
others as animals endowed with human qualities. Each character has a recognizable image. 
FN5. At least 21 characters are now involved including such well known favorites as 
Mickey and Minnie Mouse, Donald Duck, the Big Bad Wolf, the Three Little Pigs, and 
Goofy. 
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The individual defendants have participated in preparing and publishing two magazines of 
cartoons entitled "Air Pirates Funnies." The characters in defendants' magazines bear a marked 
similarity to those of plaintiff. The names given to defendants' characters are the same names 
used in plaintiff's copyrighted work. However, the themes of defendants' publications differ 
markedly from those of Disney. While Disney sought only to foster "an image of innocent 
delightfulness," defendants supposedly sought to convey an allegorical message of significance. 
Put politely by one commentator, the "Air Pirates" was "an 'underground' comic book which 
had placed several well-known Disney cartoon characters in incongruous settings where they 
engaged in activities clearly antithetical to the accepted Mickey Mouse world of scrubbed faces, 
bright smiles and happy endings." It centered around "a rather bawdy depiction of the Disney 
characters as active members of a free thinking, promiscuous, drug ingesting counterculture." 
* * * 
Three years after granting the preliminary injunction, the district court granted summary 
judgment for plaintiff. ... * * * In addition to granting Disney a permanent injunction, the court 
ordered defendants to deliver all infringing materials to Disney's counsel. Costs were awarded to 
Disney, and the amount of damages and reasonable attorney's fees to be paid to Disney was 
submitted to a magistrate for preliminary assessment. Only the question of defendants' liability is 
before us. We affirm as to copyright violation and reverse and remand as to the remainder. 
1. Copyright Infringement 
The issue that has attracted the most attention from the parties in this case is whether 
defendants' copies of the images of Disney's characters are infringements of Disney's copyright. 
In order to answer the subsidiary questions of whether Disney's characters are copyrightable and 
if so whether they were infringed, and whether defendants' infringement can be excused by the 
fair use defense or can be protected by the First Amendment, it is important to begin by noting 
what statute is controlling. * * * The new Copyright Act expressly provides that all causes of 
action that arose under the Copyright Act before January 1, 1978, "shall be governed by title 17 
as it existed when the cause of action arose." Public Law # 94-553, 90 Stat. 2600 (Transitional 
and Supplementary Provisions § 112), reproduced in 17 U.S.c. § 501 note. Therefore to the 
extent the legal issues in this case are controlled by statute, the old Copyright Act governs. 
A. Copyrightability 
In some instances Disney'S copyrights cover a book and others an entire strip of several 
cartoon panels. The fact that its characters are not the separate subject of a copyright does not 
preclude their protection, however, because Section 3 of the then Copyright Act provided that 
Disney's copyrights included protection for "all the copyrightable component parts of the work 
copyrighted" (note 7 Supra ). 
The essence of defendants' argument is that characters are never copyrightable and 
therefore cannot in any way constitute a copyrightable component part. That argument flies in 
the face of a series of cases dating back to 1914 that have held comic strip characters protectable 
under the old Copyright Act. See Detective Comics, Inc. v. Bruns Publications Inc., III F.2d 
432 (2d Cir. 1940); Fleischer Studios v. Freundlich, 73 F.2d 276 (2d Cir. 1934), certiorari 
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denied, 294 U.S. 717, 55 S.Ct. 516, 79 L.Ed. 1250; King Features Syndicate v. Fleischer, 299 F. 
533 (2d Cir. 1924); Detective Comics, Inc. v. Fox Publications Inc., 46 F.Supp. 872 
(S.D.N.Y.1942); Hill v. Whalen & Martell, Inc., 220 F. 359 (S.D.N.Y.1914); 1 Nimmer on 
Copyright § 30. It is true that this Court's opinion in Warner Brothers Pictures v. Columbia 
Broadcasting System, 216 F.2d 945 (9th Cir. 1954), certiorari denied, 348 U.S. 971, 75 S.Ct. 
532, 99 L.Ed. 756, lends some support to the position that characters ordinarily are not 
copyrightable. There the mystery writer Dashiell Hammett and his publisher entered into a 1930 
contract with Warner Brothers giving the movie production company copyright and various other 
rights to a "certain story * * * entitled Maltese Falcon" involving the fictional detective Sam 
Spade. In 1946, Hammett and other defendants used the Maltese Falcon characters in other 
writings, causing Warner Brothers to sue for copyright infringement and "unfair use and 
competition." After pointing out the sophisticated nature of the plaintiff, we construed the 
contracts between the parties and held: 
"We are of the opinion that since the use of characters and character names are nowhere 
specifically mentioned in the agreements (including the assignment of copyright 
instrument), but that other items, including the title, 'The Maltese Falcon', and their use 
are specifically mentioned as being granted (to Warner Brothers), that the character rights 
with the names cannot be held to be within the grants, and that under the doctrine of 
Ejusdem generis, general language cannot be held to include them." (Footnote omitted.) 
After so holding, Judge Stephens' opinion considered "whether it was ever intended by 
the copyright statute that characters with their names should be under its protection." In that 
context he concluded that such a restriction on Hammett's future use of a character was 
unreasonable, at least when the characters were merely vehicles for the story and did not "really 
constitute" the story being told. Judge Stephens' reasons for that conclusion provide an important 
indication of the applicability of that conclusion to comic book characters as opposed to literary 
characters. In reasoning that characters "are always limited and always fall into limited patterns," 
Judge Stephens recognized that it is difficult to delineate distinctively a literary character. Cf. 
Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1930), certiorari denied, 282 U.S. 902, 
51 S.Ct. 216, 75 L.Ed. 795. When the author can add a visual image, however, the difficulty is 
reduced. See generally 1 Nimmer on Copyright s 30. Put another way, while many literary 
characters may embody little more than an unprotected idea, a comic book character, which has 
physical as well as conceptual qualities, is more likely to contain some unique elements of 
expression. Because comic book characters therefore are distinguishable from literary characters, 
the Warner Brothers language does not preclude protection of Disney's characters. 
B. Infringement and Fair Use 
Defendants do not contend that their admitted copying was not substantial enough to 
constitute an infringement, and it is plain that copying a comic book character's graphic image 
constitutes copying to an extent sufficient to justify a finding of infringement. See 2 Nimmer on 
Copyright s 143.12; see generally Sid & Marty Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 
1157 (9th Cir. 1977); Henry Holt & Co. Inc. v. Liggett & Myers Tobacco Co., 23 F.Supp. 302 
(E.D.Pa.1938). Defendants instead claim that this infringement should be excused through the 
application of the fair use defense, since it purportedly is a parody of Disney's cartoons. 
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At least since this Court's controversial ruling in Benny v. Loew's Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th 
Cir. 1956), affirmed by an equally divided Court, 356 U.S. 43, 78 S.Ct. 667,2 L.Ed.2d 583, the 
standards for applying the fair use defense in parody cases, like the standards for applying fair 
use in other contexts, have been a source of considerable attention and dispute. As a general 
matter, while some commentators have urged that the fair use defense depends only on whether 
the infringing work fills the demand for the original (see, e.g., Note, Piracy or Parody: Never the 
Twain, 38 U.Colo.L.Rev. 550 (1966); see generally 2 Nimmer on Copyright s 145), this Court 
and others have also consistently focused on the substantiality of the taking. * * * 
In inquiring into the substantiality of the taking, the district court read our Benny opinion 
to hold that any substantial copying by a defendant, combined with the fact that the portion 
copied constituted a substantial part of the defendant's work, automatically precluded the fair use 
defense. That such a strict reading of Benny was unjustified is indicated first by the fact that it 
would essentially make any fair use defense fruitless. If the substantiality of the taking necessary 
to satisfy the first half of that test is no different from the substantiality necessary to constitute an 
infringement, then the Benny test would be reduced to an absurdity, covering any infringement 
except those falling within the much-criticized and abandoned exception for cases in which the 
part copied was not a substantial part of the defendant's work. 
The language in Benny concerning the substantiality of copying can be given a reading 
much more in keeping with the context of that case and the established principles at the time of 
that case if the opinion is understood as setting a threshold that eliminates from the fair use 
defense copying that is virtually complete or almost verbatim. Accord 2 Nimmer on Copyright s 
145. It was an established principle at the time of Benny that such verbatim copying precluded 
resort to the fair use defense. See, e.g., Leon v. Pacific Telephone & Telegraph Co., 91 F.2d 484 
(9th Cir. 1937). Moreover, the Benny facts presented a particularly appropriate instance to apply 
that settled principle. As the Benny district court found, Benny's "Autolight" tracked the 
parodied "Gas Light" in almost every respect: the locale and period, the setting, characters, story 
points, incidents, climax and much of the dialogue all were found to be identical. 131 F.Supp. 
165, 171. In this context, Benny should not be read as taking the drastic step of virtually turning 
the test for fair use into the test for infringement. See Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National 
Broadcasting Co., 137 F.Supp. 348 (S.D.Ca1.l955). To do otherwise would be to eliminate fair 
use as a defense except perhaps for those infringers who added an extra act at the end of their 
parody. Thus Benny should stand only as a threshold test that eliminates near-verbatim copying. 
In the absence of near-verbatim copying, other courts have analyzed the substantiality of copying 
by a parodist by asking whether the parodist has appropriated a greater amount of the original 
work than is necessary to "recall or conjure up" the object of his satire. Berlin v. E. C. 
Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1964), certiorari denied, 379 U.S. 822,85 S.Ct. 46,13 
L.Ed.2d 33.[FN13] 
FN 13. In so construing Benny, we necessarily disagree with its dictum that a parody is 
treated no differently than any other taking. See Berlin v. E. C. Publications, Inc., 329 
F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1964), certiorari denied, 379 U.S. 822,85 S.Ct. 46,13 L.Ed.2d 33. 
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In order to facilitate application of either the Benny threshold test or the Berlin test, it is 
important to determine what are the relevant parts of each work that are compared in analyzing 
similarity. Plaintiff assumes in its brief that the graphic depiction, or pictorial illustration, is 
separately copyrightable as a component part, so that a verbatim copy of the depiction alone 
would satisfy the Benny test. Defendants proceed on the assumption that comparing their 
characters with plaintiffs involves a comparison not only of the physical image but also of the 
character's personality, pattern of speech, abilities, and other traits. Apparently this issue has not 
been addressed previously, and neither position is without merit. On the one hand, since an 
illustration in a book or catalogue can be copyrighted separately (see, e.g., Lin-Brook Builders 
Hardware v. Gertler, 352 F.2d 298 (9th Cir. 1965», it might follow that an illustration in a comic 
strip is entitled to the same protection by virtue of Section 3 of the former Copyright Act. On the 
other hand, to a different extent than in other illustrations, a cartoon character's image is 
intertwined with its personality and other traits, so that the "total concept and feel" (Roth 
Greeting Cards v. United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970» of even the component 
part cannot be limited to the image itself. 
We need not decide which of these views is correct, or whether this copying was so 
substantial to satisfy the Benny test, because it is our view that defendants took more than is 
allowed even under the Berlin test as applied to both the conceptual and physical aspects of the 
characters. In evaluating how much of a taking was necessary to recall or conjure up the original, 
it is first important to recognize that given the widespread public recognition of the major 
characters involved here, such as Mickey Mouse and Donald Duck, in comparison with other 
characters very little would have been necessary to place Mickey Mouse and his image in the 
minds of the readers. Second, when the medium involved is a comic book, a recognizable 
caricature is not difficult to draw, so that an alternative that involves less copying is more likely 
to be available than if a speech, for instance, is parodied. Also significant is the fact that the 
essence of this parody did not focus on how the characters looked, but rather parodied their 
personalities, their wholesomeness and their innocence. [FN 15] Thus arguably defendants' 
copying could have been justified as necessary more easily if they had paralleled closely (with a 
few significant twists) Disney characters and their actions in a manner that conjured up the 
particular elements ofthe innocence of the characters that were to be satirized. While greater 
license may be necessary under those circumstances, here the copying of the graphic image 
appears to have no other purpose than to track Disney's work as a whole as closely as possible. 
FNI5. In making this distinction, we do not regard it as fatal, as some courts have done 
(see, e.g., Walt Disney Productions v. Mature Pictures Corp., 389 F.Supp. 1397 
(S.D.N.Y.1975», that the "Air Pirates" were parodying life and society in addition to 
parodying the Disney characters. Such an effect is almost an inherent aspect of any 
parody. To the extent that the Disney characters are not also an object of the parody, 
however, the need to conjure them up would be reduced if not eliminated. 
Defendants' assertion that they copied no more than necessary appears to be based on an 
affidavit, which stated that "the humorous effect of parody is best achieved when at first glance 
the material appears convincingly to be the original, and upon closer examination is discovered 
to be quite something else" (Br. 20-21). The short answer to this assertion, which would also 
justify substantially verbatim copying, is that when persons are parodying a copyrighted work, 
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the constraints of the existing precedent do not permit them to take as much of a component part 
as they need to make the "best parody." Instead, their desire to make the "best parody" is 
balanced against the rights of the copyright owner in his original expressions. That balance has 
been struck at giving the parodist what is necessary to conjure up the original, and in the absence 
of a special need for accuracy, that standard was exceeded here. By copying the images in their 
entirety, defendants took more than was necessary to place firmly in the reader's mind the 
parodied work and those specific attributes that are to be satirized. See Netterville, Parody, 
Mimicry and Humorous Commentary, 35 So.Cal.L.Rev. 225, 238 (1962). 
Because the amount of defendant's copying exceeded permissible levels, summary 
judgment was proper. * * * 
C. First Amendment Considerations 
Defendants also insist that the First Amendment should bar any liability for their parody 
because otherwise protected criticism would be discouraged. * * * Because the defendants here 
could have expressed their theme without copying Disney's protected expression, Sid & Marty 
Krofft Television v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157 (9th Cir. 1977) requires that their First 
Amendment challenge be dismissed. See also Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 
U.S. 562, 577 and n. 13,97 S.Ct. 2849, 53 L.Ed.2d 965. 
II. Trademark Infringement 
Given the novelty and importance of the copyright issues in this case, plaintiffs eighth 
cause of action, which charged that defendants infringed its trademark "Silly Symphony" in their 
publications where they referred to "Silly Sympathies," received little attention from the parties 
and the district court in the proceedings below. * * * Disney's comic books bear the title "Silly 
Symphony" and defendants used the title "Silly Sympathies" as the title of two of the cartoon 
stories in their books. In each instance, the respective parties arranged the title letters on a 
curving musical staff (Def.Br. 44). Besides reference to the comic books, apparently no other 
evidence suggesting a likelihood of confusion was offered. 
On this record a grant of summary judgment for plaintiffs was improper. In discussing 
how district courts should attempt to determine likelihood of confusion, we previously have 
listed a wide range of factors that should be taken into account. While a comparison of the mark 
and the imitation is one such factor, that comparison should not be a simple, visual, side-by-side 
comparison but rather the mark and the imitation should be viewed "in light of what occurs in 
the marketplace," (James Burrough Ltd. v. Sign of Beefeater, Inc., 540 F.2d 266, 275 (7th Cir. 
1976», taking into account the "circumstances surrounding the purchase of the goods." Procter 
& Gamble Co. v. Conway, 419 F.2d 1332, 1335, 57 CCPA 865 (1970). By making a simple 
abstract comparison, the district court apparently did not consider that defendants' imitation 
appeared only in the middle of their comic books and that defendants' comic books were sold in 
adult, counter-culture stores. When put in that context and when it is therefore recognized that 
the imitation would be seen by an adult in a counter-culture store who in all probability before 
seeing the imitation would already have been struck by the incompatibility of defendants' work 
with Disney's, as well as defendants' proper attribution of source in the front of each book, the 
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likelihood that the use of "Silly Sympathies" would be confusing is markedly diminished. See 
Girl Scouts of the u.S. of A. v. Personality Posters Mfg. Co., 304 F.Supp. 1228 (S.D.N.Y.1969). 
Notably, several of the other factors that we have directed district courts to consider also 
diminish the likelihood of confusion on the present state of the record. For example, there is no 
proof of actual confusion. Nor is there any indication of improper intent by defendants in their 
use of "Silly Sympathies." In view of the district court's apparent reliance on an abstract 
comparison of the marks and the fact that the factual issues that might be explored would be 
helpful in determining likelihood of confusion, its order granting summary judgment on the 
eighth cause of action is reversed and remanded for trial. 
* * * 
Judgment affirmed as to copyright infringement and reversed and remanded as to 
trademark infringement, unfair competition and trade disparagement. 
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Suggested Elements for Briefing Appellate Cases for Full Understanding of Them 
1. The parties, the deciding court, and the year of decision. 
2. In a civil case, who sued whom for what? (Who was angry at whom, and why?) What 
remedy was sought? (What did the complaining party really want?) If it was a criminal 
trial, what was the defendant (a) charged with and (b) convicted of? 
3. What is the defense's "theory of the case"? What is his/her story as to what happened? 
4. What was/were the ruling(s) at trial from which the appeal was taken? (What is/are the 
question(s) before the appellate court?) Recount procedural steps of consequence (if 
more than one appellate level, at each appellate court) before arriving at this court. 
5. What was the ultimate action taken by this court (e.g., affirmed, reversed, remanded (for 
what action?))? 
6. What did each party argue as to each issue? 
7. What was the appellate court's holding as to each issue on appeal? (Incorporate both the 
rule of law and the standard of review - if that standard was anything other than de novo 
review of a question of law - in your statement of the holding. If the standard of review 
was abuse of discretion, for example, the holding would be that it was (or was not) an 
abuse of discretion ... ; this is far more correct than stating a holding as simply that the 
ruling "was affirmed or reversed.") 
8. What was its reasoning as to each issue? 
9. If there was a concurrence or a dissent, how would it have held? What was its reasoning? 
After reading the case, think critically: does the court's reasoning make sense? Will its 
application provide the right results in future cases? 
* * * 
The format required by each professor may vary, but at a minimum they will all want you 
to know the facts, the holding, and the reasoning of the case. 
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1. Walt Disney Productions v. Air Pirates (9th Cir. 1978). 
2. Defendants Air Pirates, et al., published "underground comics" copying the names and 
likenesses of 21 of Plaintiff-Disney' s cartoon characters (including Mickey and Minnie 
Mouse), but portraying them as promiscuous and drug-abusing. Disney sued Air Pirates 
in federal court for (1) federal copyright infringement, (2) trademark infringement, and 
(3), via pendent jurisdiction, unfair competition, trade disparagement and interference 
with Disney's business under California law. 
Disney sought an injunction, destruction of the Air Pirates comic books, damages, costs, 
and attorney's fees. 
3. Air Pirates admitted copying the Disney cartoon characters, but argued that the copying 
was permissible under the law, on three different theories: 
(1) Cartoon characters are not copyrightable; 
(2) Even if the characters are copyrightable, Air Pirates' copying was a parody of the 
Disney works, and thus was permitted as "fair use"; and 
(3) If the copying was not fair use, then it was nonetheless permissible under the First 
Amendment, which trumped the copyright law. 
4. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California initially granted 
Disney a temporary restraining order, stopping further publication by Air Pirates. The 
court then granted Disney a preliminary injunction. Ultimately, it granted summary 
judgment for Disney on all three counts. The district court issued a permanent injunction 
against Air Pirates, ordered it to deliver all infringing materials to Disney's lawyers, and 
to pay Disney's court costs, damages, and reasonable attorney's fees. 
Air Pirates appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
5. The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part: 
(l) It affirmed the granting of summary judgment for the plaintiff as to copyright 
infringement. 
(2) It reversed the granting of summary judgment for the plaintiff as to trademark 
infringement and remanded for trial on the issue whether consumers were likely 
to confuse Air Pirates' works with Disney's. 
(3) It reversed the granting of summary judgment for the plaintiff on the state law 
claims: (a) as to unfair competition, due to failure to prove likelihood of 
confusion, and (b) failure to plead or prove sufficient facts for the other common 
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law theories alleged, and remanded for the district court to determine which state 
law theories were properly pleaded, and to proceed to trial on those theories. 
[This part was edited from your copy of the case.] 
6 - 8 Copyright Cause of Action 
Issue 1: Copyrightability of Cartoon Characters 
6. Defendants, relying on language in Warner Bros v. CBS (9th Cir. 1954) (the "Sam 
Spade" case), argued that characters cannot be copyrightable when they are merely 
"vehicles for the story" and do not constitute the story itself. 
7. The Air Pirates court first pointed out that the holding in Warner Bros. was one of 
contract law, not copyright law, but then distinguished its dictum there as regarding 
"literary characters" and as recognizing merely that "it is difficult to delineate 
distinctively a literary character" so as to make that character copyrightable. The Air 
Pirates court distinguished cartoon characters from literary characters and cited a line of 
cases holding comic strip characters copyrightable under the 1909 Copyright Act. 
8. Held: Warner Bros. does not preclude copyright protection of comic book characters, 
which have visual qualities. Disney'S characters here are copyrightable "component 
parts" of its comics, under § 3 of the Copyright Act of 1909. 
Issue 2: Fair Use 
6. Defendants admit that they copied the characters' visual images from plaintiff, but argue 
that their copying is excused under the fair use defense because they were parodying 
plaintiff s work. 
7. The Ninth Circuit rejects the dictum in its own decision in Benny v. Loew's (9th Cir. 
1956) that parody, just like any other taking, is infringing if it copies substantially from 
the plaintiff. It reads Benny as holding only that "virtually complete" or "near verbatim" 
copying will not be fair use. 
The Air Pirates court cites with approval Berlin v. E. C Publications (2d Cir. 1964), 
which permits a parodist to copy the amount which is necessary to "conjure up" the 
original work which is the object of its parody (parodying the plaintiff s work is what 
necessitates and thus excuses copying it to this extent, n.15). 
8. Held: Even under the Berlin test, defendants' copying was not fair use. Taking the entire 
image was more than was necessary to have the readers recognize them: (1) the 
characters are widely known; (2) a caricature could be easily drawn; (3) and, since the 
object of the parody was the characters' innocence and wholesomeness, those elements 
were the ones they could have played up. 
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Issue 3: First Amendment 
6. Defendants argue that the First Amendment prevents imposing any liability for parody; to 
impose liability will have a chilling effect on protected speech. 
7. Defendants could have made their point without infringing copyright. 
8. Held: Application of the copyright law does not interfere with First Amendment rights 
when defendants can express their ideas without infringing copyright. 
6 - 8 Trademark Cause of Action 
6. Plaintiff owns a trademark in the title of its comic books, "Silly Symphony," arranged on 
a curving musical staff. Disney argues that defendants infringed that mark by using the 
title "Silly Sympathies," arranged on a curving musical staff, for two of its cartoon stories 
in its "Air Pirates Funnies" books. 
7. The district court compared the publications and found a likelihood of confusion. It 
failed to consider that defendants' works are sold in "adult" stores and that the "Silly 
Sympathies" term occurs only in the middle of the book, after the consumer likely 
realizes the book is not a Disney product. There was no evidence of actual confusion, nor 
of any intent by defendants to confuse consumers as to the source of the goods. 
8. Held: Error to enter summary judgment for plaintiff; reversed and remanded for trial. 
II 
Questions for Discussion 
1. What should be the rule as to when the copying of copyrighted material for parodic 
purposes is "fair use" and thus not infringing? Should it differ from the usual rule in any 
way? 
2. Ifparody should be a favored use in some way, how should parody be defined? Need it 
criticize the copyrighted work itself? 
3. If the copying in Air Pirates (an except is shown below) was excessive and thus 
infringing, how much of a change would have been enough to make the defendants' use 
"fair use"? 
The Air Pirat«s ' 'e!"JIO" ()( Mickey and ~innie , 
4. Is today's Web site's "Not Mickey" infringing? 
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